The Poltava affair

In this book, the author of Disaster at Bari gives a full, detailed account of "Operation Frantic Joe" the only major attempt at cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II—and a painfully accurate foreshadowing of the course of post-war relations between the two countries. The plan was simple: U.S. bombers taking off from England would bomb strategic targets in Eastern Germany, and land at Soviet bases to refuel before completing the shuttle run back to England. Not only would these hard-toreach targets be struck, but in addition, President Roosevelt and American military planners hoped, the operation would cause the Nazis to move more forces to the Eastern Front—weakening their defenses in France, where the Allies were planning to land—and open the way to closer cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Glenn B. Infield's account—based on a careful study of recently de-classified documents and interviews with many of the participants —shows why all three goals were destined for failure almost from the outset. He traces the tortuous seven months of formal negotiations —Stalin demanding and often receiving topsecret U.S. intelligence and equipment in return for his cooperation; the Americans, while meeting these demands, having to agree to sharp reductions in the number of bases proposed, the number of servicemen who could be stationed there, the corridors the incoming planes could use, the quantity and type of navigation aids, even the enemy targets to be bombed. But the fatal compromise, Infield indicates, was in the area of base defense. Stalin insisted that the Russians provide all air defense for the bases, and the Americans, eager to stage the first "Frantic" mission before D-Day, granted him this point too. The inadequacy of these arrangements became clear shortly after the second "Frantic" task force landed in Russia. On the night of June 21, 1944. the Luftwaffe attacked the American air base at Poltava. Unchallenged by the Red Air Force, the Germans bombed the field for more than an hour, damaging or destroying more than sixty B-17S, along with virtually the entire supply of fuel, ammunition, and material at Poltava. Why did this tragedy occur? Infield has unearthed evidence that it probably happened on orders from the Kremlin. Stalin, he maintains, was looking not toward the immediate goal of defeating the Axis powers, but toward his own long-range plans for world domination: the Soviet dictator saw "Operation Frantic" as a way of making U.S. forces look impotent, while still making possible the continued flow of American military equipment and knowhow. As a result, the hard work of many courageous and resourceful men—captured in Infield's astute character sketches and vivid combat narratives—was largely wasted. But the greatest tragedy, Infield writes, was the failure by all the Americans involved to recognize that this strange and strained alliance with Russia could only be short-lived, and that the Poltava affair was a clear warning of the rigid polarization that would mark the postwar world. G L E N N B. I N F I E L D is a former pilot and major in the United States Air Force. He has been a writer—primarily in the fields of aviation and military history—for 20 years; his books include Unarmed and Unafraid, a history of aerial reconnaissance, and Disaster at Bari, the story of the top-secret World War II catastrophe that released 100 tons of poison gas in an Italian harbor.