Semantics of Aesthetic Judgements

the long version

Are aesthetic judgements simply expressions of personal preference or do they have some non-subjective basis? In recent years, philosophers of language have assumed that aesthetic judgements are similar to judgements that employ predicates of personal taste such as 'tasty' and 'delicious." As such, to judge that an oratorio like the St. Matthew Passion is glorious is also a report about what some listener likes. If two people disagree about whether the St. Matthew Passion is glorious, neither has made a mistake. Philosophers of art have tended to disagree with this view. They have distinguished aesthetic predicates such as 'serene,' 'balanced,' and 'glorious' from predicates such as 'tasty.' On this view, the judgement that some artwork is serene or even that it is beautiful is a report about the work, not a report about how a person responds to the work. Aesthetic judgements are not just statements about personal preferences. This volume brings together contemporary philosophers of art and philosophers of language to debate the status of aesthetic judgements. -- Adatped from the publisher's description