The Economics of Public Choice

the long version

In The Economics of Public Choice, Patrick McNutt evaluates a range of public choice concepts including rent-seeking, voting and voter behaviour, the growth of government and bureaucracy. This authoritative new text offers a refreshing insight into traditional public choice territory, using diagrammatic exposition coupled with insightful commentary. Each chapter develops its arguments from the first principles to a comprehensive review of the main issues. Evidence on the growth of government is analysed and rent-seeking is presented with an emphasis on property rights. Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy is reexamined against the background of the bureau-shaping models. In his approach to the economic theory of clubs, the author examines possible non-economic factors at play in the optimal provision of a public good. A final chapter on democracy reexamines the Downsian question: why bother to vote? This refreshing and critical evaluation of the traditional concepts of public choice analysis judiciously balances micro and macro issues, ensuring that it will be welcomed by students, academic and professional economists and policy makers.