Improper influence

Why is there still so much dissatisfaction with the role of special interest groups in financing American election campaigns, even though no aspect of interest group politics has been so thoroughly regulated and constrained? This book argues that the campaign finance laws prevent many citizen groups from forming effective political action committees (PACs) - organizations created by interest groups to raise and spend money in elections - while the regulations are less of an obstacle to business groups in forming PACs. This results, the author asserts, in a campaign finance system which is biased in favor of economic interests. The author argues that the laws regulating PACs ignore the real difficulties of political mobilization - problems that political scientists have expounded in both theoretical and empirical analyses of collective action. The author concludes that our campaign finance laws reflect a fundamental discrepancy between our ideals about the role of small individual contributors and the real ways in which broadly based groups actually get organized. Deregulating group activity, the author suggests, may be the only way to promote pluralism and reduce the dominance of the campaign finance system by economic institutions. . Gais makes a significant contribution to the literature on interest groups, election and campaign finance reform, and the role of money in politics. This volume will interest specialists in American politics, collective action, the role of business in politics and public choice as well as policymakers involved in campaign finance reform.