Objectivity in law

the long version

The question of objectivity in legal interpretation has emerged in recent years as a highly important topic in contemporary jurisprudence. This original book addresses the issue of how and in what sense legal interpretation can be objective. The author supports the possibility of objectivity in law and spells out the content of objectivity involved. He then provides a comprehensive defence against the classical, as well as less well-known, objections to the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation. The discussion is firmly grounded in metaphysics, which sets the book apart from other similar discussions in jurisprudence. Stavropoulos identifies an important source of resistance to acceptance of the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation: a widely-held but faulty semantic. He then develops an alternative semantic framework which draws on influential theories in contemporary philosophy. The book shows that objectivism is a natural, commonsensical position, and rejects the currently popular notion that objectivism requires extravagant or bizarre metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion presents the opportunity to reinterpret major debates in jurisprudence and to show how influential theories, notably H. L. A. Hart's and Ronald Dworkin's, bear on that central issue.